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SELF-DETERM[NATION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 2002 UNION
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: TRACING
THE ORIGINS OF KOSOVO'S SELF-DETERMINATION
ENVER HASANI, PHD*
INTRODUCTION
The Serb-Montenegrin Union ("USM") is generally regarded as a
means of preventing the further fragmentation of the constituent republics
of the former Yugoslavia, which includes preventing the future independ-
ence of Kosovo. The Union Agreement of March 20021 was signed not
only to prevent Montenegro's secession, but to thwart Kosovo's outright
independence. Under the terms of the agreement, sovereignty over Kosovo
reverts back to Serbia if Montenegro secedes from the USM. 2 Independ-
ence for Kosovo is contemplated neither within the USM nor after the
USM's dissolution.
Although the future of the Serb-Montenegrin Union is itself uncertain,
the structure of the USM reflects the European position on Kosovo's self-
determination. The USM is not only one model for Kosovo's future politi-
cal and legal position; at least in the minds of many EU opinion leaders, it
is also a useful reflection of the external political constraints likely to cir-
cumscribe other options for Kosovo--constraints that have consistently
been applied under the Badinter Commission principles, in the Dayton
* Dr. Enver Hasani is Professor of International Law and Relations at the University of Pristina
in Kosovo. Parts of this Article are reprinted from ENVER HASANI, SELF-DETERMINATION,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA (2003) with
kind permission from the Austrian Ministry of Defence.
1. Agreement on Principles of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro Within the Framework
of a Union of States (2002) [hereinafter Union Agreement]. The Union Agreement was signed in Bel-
grade on March 14, 2002, under the supervision of Javier Solana, the European Union ("EU") High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The Agreement is often referred to as the "Solana
Agreement." For the full text, see http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/c604a3782756fa27cI256b-
8100663089?OpenDocument&Click
= (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
2. The Provision on Reconsideration provides:
Upon the expiration of a three-year period, the member states shall be entitled to instituting
proceedings for the change of the state status, that is, withdrawal from the state union. If
Montenegro withdraws from the state union, international documents related to the FRY, the




Accords, in the Rambouillet negotiations, and finally in the Serb-
Montenegrin Union.
Provisions of the Union Agreement bear witness to the fact that the
Western stance on Kosovo's self-determination has been very consistent
since 1991. To prove such consistency, this Article traces the Euro-Atlantic
position on self-determination from the first opinion of the Badinter Com-
mission for the former Yugoslavia in November 1991 up through the Union
Agreement of 2002.3
I argue in this Article that there are initial flaws in the implementation
process of the Union Agreement, and that these implementation problems
threaten the ultimate success of the USM. The Union Agreement has a
good chance of surviving if the international administration clearly pursues
the path and the agenda of the European Union ("EU") in foreign policy.
This is not what is happening at present. Currently, there are two agendas
in Kosovo, one pursued by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
("UNMIK"), 4 and another pursued by local Kosovar Albanians and others
(primarily the United States), whose security concerns in Kosovo take
precedence. Neither is aligned with the EU agenda. In general terms, the
EU agenda is related not to security per se, but to peace, which is defined
in terms of filling the power gap left after the end of the Cold War with soft
power rather than hard power, much in the manner described by Robert
Kagan in his seminal work on transatlantic relations. 5 In contrast to the
expectations of some European leaders, the Kosovo crisis did not manage
to rejuvenate any the European defensive mechanisms that developed fol-
lowing the fall of the Berlin Wall.
6
The main challenge to the realization of the EU's goals in the imple-
mentation process of the Union Agreement is the cohesiveness of the new
union. Simply put, the agreement fails to address the same issues and con-
3. 1 do not examine the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK!REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.-
unmikonline.org/constframework.htm. The Constitutional Framework is a consequence of other docu-
ments and has no importance as a single document looked at in isolation and on its own terms.
4. UNMIK is the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. See generally
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Introduction, 80 CHI-KENT L. REV. 3 (2005).
5. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER (2003); see also ZBIGN[EW BRZEZINSKI, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL
LEADERSHIP 7-40 (2004). For special and concrete effects of this policy in Kosovo and its successes
and failures, see generally Orla McBreen, The Diplomatic Involvement of the EU in the Kosovo Crisis,
in OLD FRONTIERS-NEW FRONTIERS: THE CHALLENGE OF KOSOVO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION 79 (Dieter Mahncke ed., 2001).
6. See Manuel Szapiro, Will the Kosovo Crisis Rejuvenate CFSP and European Defence?, in
OLD FRONTIERS-NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 5, at 203.
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cerns that eventually led to the violent and tragic destruction of Yugoslavia,
namely the divisive force of nationalism and the unsatisfactory position of
the Albanians in the region vis-A-vis others. The EU, as the key player in
the drafting process of the Union Agreement, lacks the necessary means to
build social and political cohesion within the new Serb-Montenegrin Un-
ion. Moreover, the European approach lacks popular appeal among the
majority of the Kosovar Albanians. Most likely, the Union Agreement will
come to be a cause of political and ethnic violence for a long time, no mat-
ter the scale and intensity of hard work in the field by EU foreign policy
personnel.
I. THE BADINTER COMMISSION OPINIONS
A. The Badinter Commission Generally
The Badinter Commission is a body that was formed within the frame-
work of the 1991 Hague Conference on Yugoslavia. 7 The former European
Commission ("EC" now known as the EU) led the Hague Conference and
established the Commission. The Commission was named after French
judge and lawyer, Robert Badinter. No discussion of Yugoslav self-
determination, its forms, and its content is complete without an understand-
ing of the work of the Commission. The Badinter Commission clarified the
so-called Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and
in the Soviet Union.8 It provided, above all, a framework for the EC and the
international community at large to settle sovereignty and self-
determination issues in Yugoslavia. 9 Nevertheless, the work of the Com-
mission has resulted in divergent, and in some cases, controversial interpre-
tations among scholars.10
7. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11 & July 4, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter Badinter Commis-
sion: Opinions] (Introductory Note by Maurizio Ragazzi) (explaining the background of the Badinter
Commission).
8. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the "Guidelines on the Recognition
of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," 31 I.L.M. 1485 [hereinafter EC Declaration &
Guidelines]. The Guidelines were issued on December 16, 1991, in the form of a declaration intended to
impact the ongoing dissolution of the former Communist federation. Id.
9. See id.; see also THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN
DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 83-121, 149-213 (1999); STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-
MAKtNG EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 69-119, 254-309 (2000); James Gow, Serbian
Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Na-
tion?, 72 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 456,461-62 (1994).
10. The Badinter Commission's claim to international legitimacy was weaker than that of earlier
commissions in Africa dealing with the status of new states. Neither Yugoslavia nor its constituent
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In providing this framework, the Badinter Commission treated "exter-
nal" self-determination quite differently from "internal" self-determination.
This distinction has been followed by most of the international efforts to
consider Kosovo within the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Ex-
ternal self-determination focuses on the right of a people to secede, such as
in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. Internal self-determination
focuses on the right of a people to have certain individual and collective
rights respected within an existing state.11 The Albanian population of
Kosovo has been uniformly relegated to internal self-determination at most,
while the Slovene, Croat, Bosnian, and Macedonian populations have been
assumed to be entitled to make a case for external self-determination.
Among its major decisions, the Commission concluded:
1. that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY")
no longer met the definition of a state;
12
2. that the Serbian minority within Bosnia was entitled to have
its nationality respected, but was not entitled to alter the
boundaries of Bosnia;
13
3. that the former internal boundaries that defined republics
within Yugoslavia had become external boundaries of new
states, and that these boundaries could not be altered without
the consent of the new states; 14 and
4. that Slovenia, 15 Macedonia, 16 Croatia, 17 and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia ("FRY") (comprising Serbia and Monte-
negro)-but not Bosnial8-were entitled to recognition as
states.
republics were members of the EC, which created the Badinter Commission. By contrast, following the
decolonization of Africa in the 1960s, the conflicting parties (Nigeria and Zaire/Congo) were full-
fledged members of the Organization of African Unity ("OAU"), which considered their status.
11. See Stephen Alvstad, The Quebec Secession Issue, With an Emphasis on the "Cultural" Side
of the Equation, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 89, 99 n.90 (2004) (explaining the distinction between
external and internal self-determination).
12. Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1497 (Badinter Opinion No. 1).
13. Id. at 1498 (Badinter Opinion No. 2); id. at 1500 (Badinter Opinion No. 3).
14. ld. at 1499-1500 (Badinter Opinion No. 3). This is an application of the principle of "uti
possidetis"--defined as "[tlhe doctrine that colonial administrative boundaries will become interna-
tional boundaries when a political subdivision or colony achieves independence." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1582 (8th ed. 2004).
15. Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1517 (Badinter Opinion No. 7).
16. ld. at 1511 (Badinter Opinion No. 6).
17. Id. at 1505 (Badinter Opinion No. 5) (recognition to be conditioned on certain amendments to
the Croatian constitution).
18. Id. at 1503 (Badinter Opinion No. 4).
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The Commission, however, made no reference to the situation in Kos-
ovo or to the 1991 Declaration of Independence by Kosovar Albanians. Its
decision regarding the sanctity of internal borders, its recognition of the
former Yugoslav republics as states, and its rejection of the request by the
Serbian minority within Bosnia to secede are generally construed as an
implied rejection of Kosovar Albanian aspirations to secede from Serbia
and be reorganized as a separate state.
With a few exceptions, 19 scholarly work has for the most part rejected
the pronouncements of the Badinter Commission. However, this rejection
has not concerned the validity of the Commission's work per se,20 but has
focused instead on the merits of the work in policy terms. Some scholars
argue that Badinter's work was nonlegal, thus putting the Commission's
entire efforts into the realm of pure politics. 2 1 Others go further and accuse
the Commission of being a direct accomplice and the very cause of the
Yugoslav dissolution and tragedy.22 Still others hold the view that the
19. See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-26 (1999);
Ove E. Bring, Correspondents 'Agora: U.N. Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM, J. INT'L L.
244 (1993); Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up of USSR and
Yugoslavia, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 131, 142-43 (Roland St. John MacDonald ed.,
1994); Vladimir Djuro Degan, L'arbitrage juridique ignore: la jurisprudence de la Commission
Badinter, in L'EX-YOUGOSLAVIE EN EUROPE: DE LA FAILLITE DES DEMOCRATIES AU PROCESSUS DE
PALX 31 (Maie-Frangoise Allain et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter L'EX-YOUGOSLAVIE EN EUROPE];
Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Correspondents' Angora: U.N. Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 240 (1993); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Jugoslavija u raspadu, 28 POLITICKA MISAO 50 (1991);
Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Samoodredenje Naroda i Teritorijalna Cjelovitost Drdfava u Uvjetima Raspada
Jugoslavije, 46 ZAKON1ITOST 543 (1992); George Karipsiadis, State Succession in the Balkans: Its
Impact Upon International Boundaries, in SOUTHEAST EUR. Y.B. 151, 151-81 (1994); M. Kelly
Malone, Correspondents' Agora: U.N. Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 246
(1993); Konstantin Obradovic, Problemi Vezani za Sukcesiju SFRJ, in MEDUNRODNO PRAVO I
JUGOSLOVENSKA KRIZA: ZBORNIK RADOVA 275 315 (Milan Sahovic ed., 1996); Alain Pellet,
L 'activitM de la Commission d'arbitrage de la Confdrence europdenne pour la paix en Yougoslavie, 38
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT'L 220 (1992); Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitra-
tion Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 178 (1992),
Milan Sahovic, Raspad SFRJ i Stvaranje Novih Drzava, in MEDUNARODNO PRAVO I JUGOSLOVENSKA
KRIZA, supra, 14-47.
20. Apart from the fact that former Yugoslavia was not a member of the EC, all actors of the
Yugoslav drama accepted the work of the Badinter Commission as legitimate. Even Serbia did not deny
the Commission's legitimacy until after it issued its first opinion on November 29, 1991. Apparently,
Serbia ultimately denied the legitimacy of Badinter's work because it hoped that the Commission would
dogmatically apply international criteria for statehood that unconditionally recognized the right to
territorial status quo on behalf of the Yugoslav federation (then controlled by Milosevic's regime in
Belgrade).
21. See, e.g., JOHN WILLIAMS, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE RISE AND
FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA 130-31, 138, 140-41 (1998); Payam Akhavan, Self-Determination and the
Disintegration of Yugoslavia. What Lessons for the International Community?, in SELF-
DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 227, 227-28, 233-35, 240-42 (Donald Clark &
Robert Williamson eds., 1996); Martyn Rady, Self-determination and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 19
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDS. 379, 382-84 (1996).
22. RENEO LUKIC & ALLEN LYNCH, EUROPE FROM THE BALKANS TO THE URALS: THE
DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 275-81 (1996); Said Mahmoudi, Recogni-
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
Commission misapplied, and misinterpreted, the internationally recognized
criteria for international statehood and self-determination.
23
B. Political Motivation
The first group of Badinter Commission critics focuses on the political
context within which the Commission operated. Once the fighting was
underway, the EC's goal was order and stability. The EC sought to contain
the conflict and used a mixture of traditional principles and innovative
ideas in order to find a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Many is-
sues on the European agenda became entangled with the development of
policy towards Yugoslavia, including the future role of the EC in foreign
policy in the region; the relationships among major EC powers (especially
France and Germany); and the relationships among the EC, the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), and the Western European Union
("WEU"). The EC was entering uncharted waters by striving to lead the
international effort to manage the crisis in Yugoslavia. Its previous diplo-
matic role focused on trade relations.24 Its role in more "classical" foreign
policy issues had been limited to discussion and coordination of positions
within the European Political Cooperation process. With the end of the
Cold War came the end of the principal reason for U.S. involvement in
European security affairs, indicating that U.S. leadership was likely to be
less decisive and the U.S. government was seeking to reduce its role. Pro-
ponents of the Common Security and Foreign Policy (the "EC CSFP"). saw
a gap for the EC to fill.25 Proposals were made for the revival of the WEU
lion of States: The Case of Former Yugoslav Republics, in CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES
NORDIC PERSPECTIVES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JERZY SZTUCKI 135, 135-59 (Ove Bring & Said Mah-
moudi eds., 1994); Raju G.C. Thomas, Nations, States, and Secession: Lessons from the Former Yugo-
slavia, MEDITERRANEAN Q., Fall 1994, at 40, 40-65; Peter Radan, The Badinter Arbitration
Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia, 25 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 537, 537 57 (1997).
23. These authors claim that Badinter could have declared Bosnia-Herzegovina as being in the
process of dissolution as of January 1992, as was former Yugoslavia in the Commission's first opinion
rendered a few months earlier in November of 1991. In other words, these authors say that Bosnia-
Herzegovina lacked effective control over its own territory and population by the time Badinter de-
clared Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a state (provided that it held a referendum on independence) See
Robert M. Hayden, Bosnia's Internal War and the International Criminal Tribunal, 22 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFFS. 45, 50-51 (1998).
24. Branislava Alendar, Evropska Uniia i SR Jugoslavia, in JUGOSLAVIA I SVET 2000, at 73-83
(Evropski Pokrct u Srbiji: Beograd, published by Belgrade-based Forum za Medjunarodne Odnose
2000). See generally Mario Zucconi, The West and the Balkan Conflict, in THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27 (Stefano Bianchini & Robert Craig Nation
eds., 1998).
25. See HAROLD JAMES, EUROPE REBORN: A HISTORY, 1914-2000, at 386-446 (2003).
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as the defense arm of the EC's new security role.26 The fact that the former
Yugoslavia was not a member of the EC mattered little in light of the new
challenges that the EC was facing at the time.
C. Innovative Approaches
The work of the Badinter Commission, as noted earlier, was in es-
sence a mixture of traditional and innovative approaches. In this context,
the authors who see the work of this body as politically motivated try to
deny the competence of the Commission's work. Being innovative and
using politically motivated judgment, however, are distinguishable. The
Commission was innovative in the way it tried to achieve the goals of order
and stability. In achieving these goals the Commission used only the for-
mer administrative borders of the Yugoslav republics as reference points.
The Commission followed the precedents set in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia. 27 This means that the Commission set no precedent itself, it only
applied an old rule in a new context, and it did so innovatively, not accord-
ing to political considerations. The innovation consisted of specifying the
nature of the new states that would succeed the former Yugoslavia and in
answering whether the new states should be dictatorships as their predeces-
sor was. This question was resolved by the Commission's imposition of
26. See SAADIA TOUVAL, MEDIATION IN THE YUGOSLAV WARS: THE CRITICAL YEARS, 1990-95,
at 45, 94 (2002); Georges-Marie Chenu, Les limites des interventions europeennes, in L'Ex-
YOUGOSLAVIE EN EUROPE, supra note 19, at 59.
27. The Commission stated, in pertinent part:
The Commission therefore takes the view that once the process in the SFRY leads to the crea-
tion of one or more independent States, the issue of frontiers, in particular those of the Repub-
lics referred to in the question before it, must be resolved in accordance with the following
principles:
First-All external frontiers must be respected in line with the principle stated in the
United Nations Charter, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)) and in the Helsinki Final Act, a
principle which also underlies Article 11 of the Vienna Convention of 23 August 1978 on the
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.
Second-The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Serbia, and possibly between other adjacent independent States may not be altered except by
agreement freely arrived at.
Third-Except when otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers pro-
tected by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for territo-
rial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized
as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 22 De-
cember 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Malt (Frontier Dispute, [1986] ICJ Re-
ports 554 at 565)... The principle applies all the more readily to the Republics since the
second and fourth paragraphs of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY stipulated that the
Republics' territories and boundaries could not be altered without their consent.
Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1499-1500 (Badinter Opinion No. 3).
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new requirements for statehood-the rule of law, democracy, and respect
for human and minority rights.28 The legitimacy of the Badinter Commis-
sion decisions should have been judged through new lenses: the goal of
order and stability was linked by the Commission to the liberal ideas of rule
of law, democracy, free market economy, and respect for human and mi-
nority rights. But if Bosnia was not yet qualified for statehood because the
views of its Serb majority had not been considered sufficiently, 29 and if
Croatia was recognized only on condition that it reform its constitution to
offer stronger protection to minorities, 30 why was the rump Yugoslavia's
subjugation of its Albanian minority virtually ignored? 3'
The Badinter Commission's spirit of innovation did not go far enough,
but it did further crystallize the criteria for international statehood. The
Commission, out of necessity, took the international criteria for granted
once the Yugoslav wars of succession started. Accordingly, it downplayed
the principle of governmental effective control as a precondition for inter-
national statehood. But this was a logical attitude because, had it accepted
this classical criterion as valid, the EC would have been required to take the
aggressor's side, that is, Milosevic's.
The recognition of former administrative borders as the boundaries of
new states was not new. The same approach, resulting in what some char-
acterize as "premature recognition," occurred in Africa during the decolo-
nization process and was aimed at keeping colonies under the control of
former colonial powers and their favored elites. 32 The Commission took a
novel approach in the case of Yugoslavia by linking the application of
these traditional criteria to liberal values, a linkage clearly missing during
the African decolonization process. The Commission applied The Guide-
lines on Recognition of New States, which stated that the EC and other
members of the international community should take into account, in their
decision to grant recognition to new states, the "political realities in each
case." 33 In the case of former Yugoslavia, parts of the country were no
28. The opinions contain firm and clear provisions regarding the conditions for statehood along
the lines of respect for human and minority rights, rule of law, and democracy. See id at 1502 (Badinter
Opinion No. 4) (Bosnia); id. at 1507 (Badinter Opinion No. 5) (Croatia); id. at 1508 (Badinter Opinion
No. 6) (Macedonia); id. at 1516-17 (Badinter Opinion No. 7) (Slovenia).
29. See id. at 1503 (Badinter Opinion No. 4) (concluding that will of the people of Bosnia to
become independent was not fully established).
30. Id. at 1505 (Badinter Opinion No. 5) (conditioning the recognition of Croatia on modification
of its constitution).
31. See id. at 1526 (Badinter Opinion No. 10) (concluding that the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)
was a new state; no reference to intemal treatment of minorities).
32. For a thorough exploration of the African experience, see Enver Hasani, Uti Possidetis Juris:
From Rome to Kosovo, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFS. 85, 88-89 (2003).
33. EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 8, at 1487.
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longer under effective control of the Federal government in Belgrade by the
time The Guidelines were issued by the EC. In fact, by the end of 1991,
apart from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, the rest of Yugo-
slavia was more or less under the control of new authorities. 34 While the
international community could not deny that some parts of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina were under Serbian control, the capitals of these re-
publics were not. It is an established international practice that emerged
from the decolonization period that no recognition should be granted to
authorities not in control of the capital city, though they may be in control
of other parts of the country. Had the Badinter Commission pursued the old
rule of total effectiveness 3 5 it would have had to support the Serbs because
they controlled so much territory in Croatia and Bosnia. Such support
would have been a tacit approval of the policy of ethnic cleansing.
36
The Badinter Commission was innovative in that it embraced democ-
ratization and respect for human rights as criteria for recognition of new
states. Otherwise, it did nothing but elaborate into more detail the practical
side of self-determination. The Commission began in the midst of the
Yugoslavian dissolution and dealt with such issues as succession, inde-
pendence referendums, minority and human rights, and former republican
administrative borders. The Commission had to address the implementation
of self-determination and its destabilizing force in international relations.
Although the Commission's rulings only addressed the breakup of Yugo-
slavia, the Commission had appeal beyond the Yugoslavian context, not
because of the legally binding force of its rulings, but because of the moral
credibility of the EC and because of the competence and professionalism of
the Commission itself.
34. As for Kosovo, its application for international recognition did not receive any response at all
in January 1992 when the Badinter Commission declared its views on this matter, although the applica-
tion had been submitted properly and in due time as demanded by the Guidelines. In scholarly work,
though, the lack of effective control over Kosovo's territory and its population is deemed as the main
reason for the nonrecognition of Kosovo's international statehood and sovereignty by the Badinter
Commission, acting on behalf of the EC and the international community at large. See Recognition of
States, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 478-80 (A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1992).
35. The traditional criteria for statehood are: (1) territory, (2) population, (3) subject to (4) an
organized political authority. Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1495 (Badinter Opinion
No. 1). If a purported government controls its capital city but not the countryside, it fails the third
criterion. Moreover, an insurgent group controlling most of the territory might come closer to satisfying
the criteria than the authority in control of the capital city.
36. Serb control of territory was reinforced by removal of the non-Serb population, a practice that
came to be known as "ethnic cleansing."
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II. THE DAYTON MODEL FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE FINAL STATUS OF KOSOVO: TREATING KOSOVO ON PAR WITH
"REPUBLIKA SRPSKA," IF NOT WORSE
The 1995 Dayton Accords 37 settled the war among Croat, Serb, and
Muslim ("Bosniak") forces in Bosnia. Bosnia had seceded from Yugoslavia
in early 1992, and at the same time, the Serb areas of Bosnia declared their
independence from Bosnia. Fighting erupted almost immediately thereafter
among Muslims, Serb irregulars, the Yugoslav National Army ("JNA"),
and Croatian irregulars. The Serbs initiated a siege of Sarajevo and other
Muslim population centers and began an intensive campaign of ethnic
cleansing, driving Muslims from their homes in territory occupied by Serb
forces. 38 By July 1992, conflict and ethnic cleansing had also broken out
between Bosnian forces and Bosnian Croat forces seeking to annex parts of
Bosnia to Croatia.39 In November 1995, the Bosnian war ended with the
negotiation of the Dayton Accords. 40
The Dayton Accords have been heavily criticized because, by recog-
nizing the "Republika Srpska" as an "entity" within the relatively weak
Bosnian state, the results of the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks from the "Re-
publika Srpska" territory were approved implicitly.4 1
Ethnic cleansing by the Serbs was part of a comprehensive strategy to
strengthen the claim of Serbs to their own political territory-perhaps as
part of a Greater Serbia, perhaps as independent statelets carved out of
Bosnia and Croatia. The creation and transformation of the Serb entities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was a coordinated process that included not only the
territory of that republic, but also large parts of neighboring Croatia. Ini-
tially, the formation of these Serb entities was connected to the new consti-
37. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35
I.L.M 75 [hereinafter Dayton Accords]. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1031 embraced the Dayton
Accords. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg. at pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995). Ex-
plicitly acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council "welcome[d] and support[ed] the
Peace Agreement and call[ed] upon the parties to fulfill in good faith the commitments entered into in
that Agreement." Id
38. See ROGER COHEN, HEARTS GROWN BRUTAL: SAGAS OF SARAJEVO (1998).
39. See generally MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA (1996) (featuring the destroyed bridge in Mostar as a symbol of the destruction of Yugoslavia
and the conflict in Bosnia).
40. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998).
41. See, e.g., Timothy William Waters, The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords, Property Disputes,
and Bosnia's Real Constitution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517, 583-84 (1999) (criticizing the Dayton Ac-
cords as legally ratifying "military and political divisions created by the war and ethnic cleansing
campaigns").
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tutional changes underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1990.42 These
changes were undertaken for the purpose of the regionalization of the re-
public in order to enable it to become a modem, reform-oriented, European
state. 43 The process of regionalization in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be
based on economic and social criteria, enhancing the effectiveness of the
whole state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 44 However, long before the war
started, it was becoming clear that the Serbs had no intention of basing
their concept of regionalization on economic or social criteria, but instead
relied exclusively on the principle of ethnicity.
45
The Serb insistence upon the ethnic principle coincided entirely with
their overall manipulation and misinterpretation of the prevailing economic
trends in some Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of
the numbers. 46 This strategy was meant to showcase the alleged Serb eco-
nomic discrimination and their economic backwardness in that republic.
47
The strategy covered not only those areas where the Serbs were in the ma-
jority, but also other areas where they lived in community with others in
very small numbers.
48
The first manifestation of this strategy, which aimed at the dismem-
berment of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, took the form of an associa-
tion named "the Community of Municipalities of Bosanska Krajin," which
was composed of nine to thirty municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
49
This entity was formed by an alleged agreement between the municipalities
called The Agreement on the Establishment of the Association of Munici-
palities (in Serbian, Dogovor o Udruzivanju u Zajednicu Opcina).5° The
resulting association had a legal and separate personality from the organs
and state structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means that it had the right
to exercise all powers otherwise falling within the jurisdiction of the Re-
42. See Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1501-02 (Badinter Opinion No. 4)
(discussing aspects of Bosnian constitutional reform).
43. KAsIM 1. BEGIC, BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA: OD VANCEOVE MISIJE DO DAYTONSKOG SPORA-
ZUMA, 1991 1996, at 45-69 (Bosnaska Knjiga, Sarajevo 1997).
44. See, for example, the Preamble of the European Charter of Self-Government (Rome 1984),
which speaks of the same values to be promoted by the local self-governments and the decentralization
of powers. European Charter of Local Self-Government, Oct. 15, 1985, Europ. TS. No, 122. For com-
ments, see GUY HOLLIS & KARIN PLOKKER, TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION:
TRANSFORMING REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NEw EUROPE (1995).
45. See Waters, supra note 41, at 525.
46. BEGIC, supra note 43, at 55-79.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. There were few proposed versions of this document so that the exact number of municipalities
remains unknown to date. See id. at 57.
50. Id. at 58.
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public of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On December 16, 1991, this "autonomous"
region was transformed into the Srpska Autonomna Oblast, or Serbian
Autonomous Area.5 1 The Declaration of this first Serbian Autonomous
Area was followed by similar declarations in other parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These actions covered almost eighty percent of the Bosnian
territory. 52 The new entities exercised jurisdiction not only over the organs
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also over defense and related issues pertaining
to the FRY.
At the same time as Serbian autonomies were emerging, Serbian au-
thorities created an "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. ' '53 This assembly was constituted on October 24, 1991. It
rendered a decision stating that the Serbs had decided to live in a common
state of Yugoslavia together with Serbia, Montenegro, and other self-styled
Serb entities in Croatia. According to the decision of the Assembly, the will
of the Serbs would be demonstrated on November 9 & 10, 1991. In justify-
ing these actions, the Serb leaders openly put forward ethnic rather than
economic or social reasons. It was called a "plebiscite," although its very
aim was the dismemberment of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plebi-
scite was indeed held on the above dates, making more explicit the idea of
a Greater Serbia. In characteristic manner, the Serbs printed their voting
lists in a blue color, leaving yellow lists for the non-Serbs. 54 This differ-
ence in color was accompanied by different questions as well. Namely, the
non-Serbs had to answer the question whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should
remain an equal republic, while the Serbs had to answer the opposite, that
is, whether they should remain within Bosnia-Herzegovina. 55
Serbia's next step following the November 1991 "plebiscite" was to
make the utmost use of the results of the plebiscite, both domestically and
internationally. Internationally, the Serbs sought to represent themselves
before the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, underway in the Hague, as a
separate party in relation to the legal organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do-
mestically, the Serb leaders used the results of the "plebiscite" to foster the
51. Both its creation and the transformation into an autonomous area were initially justified on
pure economic and social terms, although in practice it was obvious that the ethnic criterion was a
driving force. This became clear as the time went on, especially following the discovery of a Serb plan
designed for the total dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines. The plan had been
drafted in September 1991 in the name of "science" and "profession," clearly opting for ethnic principle
as the main pillar in the regionalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Economic and social factors were
manipulated and misinterpreted to serve the ethnic principle. See id.
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 60.
54. Id. at 61.
55. Id. at 60-61.
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final proclamation of the "Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-
Herzegovina" on January 9, 1992. This transformation of the previous
autonomous entities into a single republic was done in hopes that it would
be internationally recognized as a federal unit within the still-existing
Yugoslav federation and, in case that failed, as an independent and sover-
eign state.
56
The strategy failed. The Badinter Commission for the former Yugo-
slavia, in its January 1992 opinion, opted in favor of the recognition of
Slovenia and Macedonia. 57 For Bosnia and Croatia, the Commission set out
some conditions that these two Yugoslav republics were to fulfill before
any international recognition would be extended to them. The Commission
asked that a referendum be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that minority
rights be respected in Croatia. 58 Serb leaders used the Commission's co-
erced conditions as a pretext to boycott the referendum, which was held on
February 29 and March 1, 1992. Following this, Serb leaders openly threat-
ened that they would declare their own independence if Bosnia-
56. This "republic" recognized its counterpart in Croatia. Id. at 63-64. This shows that the Serbs
believed that only republic-type entities would be recognized internationally. This view relied on the
November 1991 legal opinion of the Badinter Commission for former Yugoslavia.
57. See Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1511 (Badinter Opinion No. 6); id at
1517 (Badinter Opinion No. 7). For scholarly comments see TERRETT, supra note 9.
58. In the case of Croatia, the Arbitration Commission considered that:
i. the Constitutional Act of 4 December 1991 d[id] not fully incorporate all the pro-
visions of the draft Convention of 4 November 1991, notably those contained in
Chapter II Article 2(c), under the heading "Special Status";
ii. the authorities of the Republic of Croatia should therefore supplement the Consti-
tutional Act in such a way as to satisfy those provisions; and
iii. subject to this reservation, the Republic of Croatia m[et] the necessary conditions
for its recognition by the Member States of the European Community in accor-
dance with the Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines on the Recognition
of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, adopted by the Council
of the European Communities on 16 December 1991.
Badinter Commission: Opinions, supra note 7, at 1505 (Badinter Opinion No. 5). In the case of Mace-
donia, the Arbitration Commission took the view:
" that the Republic of Macedonia satisfie[d] the tests in the Guidelines on the Rec-
ognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declara-
tion on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 16
December 1991;
" that the Republic of Macedonia ha[d], moreover, renounced all territorial claims of
any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law; that the use of
the name "Macedonia" c[ould] not therefore imply any territorial claim against
another State; and
" and that the Republic of Macedonia ha[d] given a formal undertaking in accor-
dance with international law to refrain, both in general and pursuant to Article 49
of its Constitution in particular, from any hostile propaganda against any other
State; this follow[ed] from a statement which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic made to the Arbitration Commission on 11 January 1992 in response
to the Commissions request for clarification of Constitutional Amendment II of 6
January 1992.
Id. at 1511-12 (Badinter Opinion No. 6).
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Herzegovina was recognized as a sovereign and independent state. By these
actions, the Serbs attempted to justify in advance the ethnic cleansing of all
non-Serbs from their entities.
The Serb interpretation of international statehood was an arbitrary and
entirely wrong one. They believed that only republic-type entities would be
recognized internationally, regardless of the manner in which they were
created. 59 In line with this thinking, Serbs declared their own "independent
republic" following the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on
April 6 and 7, 1992.60 This time, however, the Bosnian Serbs put aside the
idea of remaining within the rapidly digsolving Yugoslavia. In a matter of
months following the declaration of this "independent republic," the Serbs
managed to ethnically cleanse almost seventy percent of the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus securing the territorial base for their new
"state." 61 Hoping to gain international recognition for their fait accompli
policy, the Serbs left behind the old idea of Yugoslavism and focused in-
stead on a Greater Serbian project, based entirely on a policy of ethnic
cleansing of non-Serbs.
62
The initial reactions from the international community, including the
EU, were almost exclusively acceptance of the Serb assertion of interna-
tional statehood. 63 This constituted open support for the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into two or three separate states along ethnic lines. Milosevic
was generally suspected of persisting in his goal of forming a Greater Ser-
bia, but the focus had shifted to the Bosnian Serbs' claim of independence.
Only the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, adopted under U.S. leadership, man-
aged to defeat this ethnic principle. 64 Other peace plans, such as the Cutil-
iero Plan, the Vance-Owen plan, and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan were
drafted in accordance with the ethnic principle.
65
This does not mean that the EU foresaw the ethnic principle as a basis
for internal or external self-determination within the territory of former
Yugoslavia. In its documents, the EU relied instead on the principle of
59. See BEGIC, supra note 43, at 31-44; TERRETT, supra note 9, at 254-308.
60. JOZE PIRIEVEC, LE GUERRE JUGOSLAVE, 1991-1999, at 145-46 (Einaudi, Torino 2001).
61. Id. at 153-55.
62. JAMES Gow, THE SERBIAN PROJECT AND ITS ADVERSARIES: A STRATEGY OF WAR CRIMES
118-44 (2003).
63. See id. at 145-223, 263-309.
64. Dayton Accords, supra note 37.
65. For a detailed account of the five proposals on the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially
those based on ethnic criteria (all but the Dayton Accords) over the years 1992-1995, see BEGIC, supra
note 43, at 100-97; ALEKSANDER PAVKOVIK , THE FRAGMENTATION OF YUGOSLAVIA: NATIONALISM
AND WAR IN THE BALKANS 155-93 (2d ed. 2000); WOLFGANG PETRITSCH, BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA OD
DAYTONA DO EVROPE (Sarajevo 2002).
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territoriality, taking the Yugoslav republics as a reference point.66 To be
sure, the EU supplemented its adherence to the traditional principle of terri-
toriality with the promulgation of new requirements: the rule of law, de-
mocracy, and respect for human and minority rights.67 But in practice,
when problems arose in the enforcement of these conditions, the territo-
rial/ethnic principle prevailed, resulting in tolerance of the Serb policy of
ethnic cleansing.
Logically, the principles underlying the Dayton Accords' treatment of
"Republika Srpska" within Bosnia seemed to presage international support
for autonomy-almost independence-for Kosovo within Serbia. Indeed,
Kosovo seemed to occupy a stronger claim to international recognition than
"Republika Srpska." "Republika Srpska" was the beneficiary of a policy of
ethnic cleansing and genocide against an entire nation, while Kosovo pos-
sessed a clear territorial base and an ethnically dominant population despite
being the victim of the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing.
But this logic has not been reflected in reality. To be sure, efforts to
ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its non-Serbian population were prevented by
NATO military action undertaken in March-June 1999. But Kosovo legally
remains a part of the USM, which makes it doubtful that the project of
Greater Serbia has been defeated in Kosovo. It might well be the case that
the Belgrade regime has been successful at preserving its formal sover-
eignty over vast areas not inhabited by a Serbian majority, thus leaving the
international community with no choice but to assume the role of caretaker
of the Greater Serbian project, the brutal and violent realization of which is
presumably postponed until a later date when the international balance of
forces changes in favor of Serbia. In order to diminish this unhappy pros-
pect, the next section deals with the Kosovar Albanians' pursuit of self-
determination, both prior to the 1998 conflict in Kosovo and after NATO's
military action. In light of the developments considered in the next section,
the Dayton Accords represent a powerful precedent for an internationally
sanctioned agreement guaranteeing the Kosovar Albanians as least as much
autonomy as the Serbs enjoy in "Republika Srpska."
66. See EC Declaration & Guidelines, supra note 8.
67. See id. For scholarly comments, see GRANT, supra note 9, at 149 98.
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III. RAMBOUILLET PEACE ACCORD AND ITS MODEL OF SELF-
DETERMINATION: A COMPARISON OF RAMBOUILLET WITH THE DAYTON
MODEL
The Rambouillet Accords were the product of an unsuccessful attempt
by the Contact Group of the Former Yugoslavia, in late 1998 and early
1999, to mediate a settlement of the increasingly violent conflict in Kosovo
between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serb forces. 6 8 The refusal of
Serbia to agree to the Accords precipitated the NATO bombing campaign.
Furthermore, the reference in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 to the
Rambouillet Accords as a partial model for the final status of Kosovo gives
the Rambouillet Accords continuing relevance.
69
In the aftermath of the 1995 Dayton Accords, Dragoijub Micunovic,
one of the most influential Serbian opposition leaders, told the media that
Serbia felt relaxed because the international community recognized its
frontiers as international borders, and the territory of Kosovo was included
within those borders.70 The same opinion prevailed in the circles of the
Serb regime and has since been frequently reiterated in public. 71 The coin-
cidence between this position and the international community's stance that
internationally recognized borders cannot be modified, when contrasted
with the Kosovar Albanian claim to independence, reveals two crucial
things about NATO's actions against the FRY in March-June 1999 and
their possible ramifications for the future of Kosovo. The first issue is re-
lated to the international community itself, while the second is related to
Kosovo and its possibilities for achieving independent statehood.
68. The Contact Group is an informal grouping of countries, including the U.S., U.K., France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia that first came together in response to the crisis in Bosnia. Later, the EU
joined to coordinate Kosovo policy with UNMIK. The Rambouillet negotiations occurred from Febru-
ary 6-23, 1999. The Rambouillet Peace Process officially ended with the signing of the Rambouillet
Accords in Paris on March 19, 1999.
69. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999, U.N. Doe.
S/19991648 (June 7, 1999), at http:/Iwww.state.gov/www/regionsteurfksvo rambouitlet text.html
[hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. Resolution 1244 incorporates the Rambouillet Accords for deter-
mining Kosovo's future status. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg. 1 (e), U.N. Doc.
SJRESJ1244 (1999).
70. Five years later, however, Micunovic was not sure about this. Criticizing plans to secede by
June 2001 (the deadline set out for holding a referendum for the independence of this republic),
Micunovic said that Montenegro's secession from the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) would make
highly probable the secession of Kosovo as well, thus putting into danger the very survival of the FRY.
See Radio Slobodna Evropa (Apr. 1, 2001) (broadcast in South Slavic languages).
71. Regarding the so-called Kumanovo Agreement, which made it possible for NATO troops to
enter Kosovo in June 1999, and the promulgation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 12,
1999), the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Nebojsa Pavkovic, told the press in Bel-
grade that they (the Serbs) held the deeds over Kosovo because both of the above documents recog-
nized and guaranteed the integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Radio
Slobodna Evropa (Dec. 17, 1999) (broadcast in South Slavic languages).
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The above attitude in Serbian circles speaks of nothing but a certain
political orientation prevalent within Serbian society at large. This orienta-
tion takes the state, not the citizenry or ordinary individuals, as a reference
point. Regarding the issue of borders and self-determination in general, the
Serbian mentality coincides with the approach taken by the international
community following the end of the Cold War. This in no way implies that
the international community per se has created this Serbian political orien-
tation. The current orientation within Serbia stems rather from the very
nature of Serbian nationalism. However, the international community's
stance on the inviolability of former administrative borders has only further
cemented Serbian myths regarding Kosovo and Serbs' a priori right to
unquestionably rule Kosovo's majority population. 72 Why was the Bel-
grade regime given these assurances regarding the unconditional inviolabil-
ity of Serbia's borders? Was it a matter of legal principle or of a pure
realpolitik that took into account other geopolitical and geostrategic fac-
tors, particularly an international desire to avoid encouraging secessionist
movements in Northern Ireland, Tibet, Chechnya, Quebec, Bosnia, and
Macedonia? I shall try to answer these questions in the following
paragraphs.
Two dilemmas emerge when discussing the NATO intervention
against the FRY. First, a realpolitik dilemma emerges, based on geopoliti-
cal and geostrategic considerations, which means that the inviolability of
former republican borders was not an aim in itself, but a side effect of
NATO's concern for peace and stability in the Balkans (and elsewhere in
the territories of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council). Next, a
dilemma based on humanitarian considerations emerges, because humani-
tarian concerns were a publicly stated aim of NATO officials both before
and after the intervention against the FRY.73 The then Secretary General of
72. For similar views, see GREG CAMPBELL, THE ROAD TO KoSOVO: A BALKAN DIARY (1999);
TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE (2000); NOEL MALCOLM, KOsovO: A SHORT HISTORY
(1998); JULIE A. MERTUS, KOSOvO: How MYTIIS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999); STEPHEN
SCHWARTZ, KoSovo: BACKGROUND TO A WAR (2000); Shlomo Avineri, The Future of Kosovo, E.
EUR. CONST. REV., Summer 1999, at 79; Warren Zimmermann, The Demons ofKosovo, NAT'L INT.,
Spring 1998, at 5-6; Aleksa Djilas, Imagining Kosovo, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 124 (book
review).
73. This aim was expressly stated by NATO's Council in a special statement on Kosovo on De-
cember 8, 1998: "NATO's aim has been to contribute to the international efforts for stopping the hu-
manitarian crisis in Kosovo, to put an end to the violence there, and to assure a permanent solution to
the crisis in Kosovo." Kosovo INFO. CTR., DAILY REP. NO. 2264 B, Dec. 8, 1998 (Albanian version
only). On the other hand, scholars have been disunited over NATO's real motives and how NATO's
actions should be interpreted in the future. The most influential authors, such as Thomas Franck and
Antonio Cassese, have favored humanitarian considerations. See Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kos-
ovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (1999); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
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NATO, Javier Solana, put forward humanitarian considerations on the day
before the air strikes began on March 24, 1999. 74 In fact, NATO officials
referred almost exclusively to humanitarian considerations in justifying the
use of the air strikes against the FRY. This was not the case, as we shall see
below, during the early stages of the Kosovo conflict in February-March
1998. But regardless of the role of humanitarian rather than political con-
siderations in justifying the bombing campaign, the end result of the NATO
air strikes was the preservation of FRY territorial integrity and, by conse-
quence, the imposition of internal self-determination rather than independ-
ence on Kosovo in the long run. This is supported unambiguously by
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International
Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Interven-
tion", 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 828 (1999). Others have supported NATO actions against the FRY on humanitarian grounds as
well, but with reservation. These authors have argued that the Kosovo case should not set a precedent
for the future but should instead be taken as an exception due to regional considerations, Kosovo, they
say, belongs to Europe, where gross human rights violations cannot be tolerated. See W. Michael
Reisman, Kosovo 's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999). In fact, a majority of the authors take the
stance that Kosovo's location within Europe has played an important role, more or less, in NATO's
decisions to strike against the FRY. The last group of authors, cited below, does not support NATO's
actions in Yugoslavia, stressing the rule of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention in the
internal affairs of sovereign and independent states. See Jonathan 1. Chamey, Anticipatory Humanitar-
ian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1999); Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or
"Bad" War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841 (1999); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The U.N., NATO, and Interna-
tional Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57 (2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of
Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. I (1999). As for NATO itself, its officials have been explicit
that the decision to go into Kosovo did not set any precedent for its future actions elsewhere, despite
some Russians' fears and some East Europeans' hopes of deterring Russian expansion. See Paul Goble,
Another Precedent From Kosova?, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Nov. 9, 2000, at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/11/5-NOT/not-091 100.asp.
74. See Press Release, Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO (Mar. 23, 1999), available
at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm. When the air campaign started, NATO leaders
referred more explicitly to humanitarian considerations as a basis for their actions against the FRY. See
BILtL CLINTON, NE LUFTfN, JU PAQEN: MESAZHE, ARTIKUJ, KONFERENCA SHTYPI, INTERVISTA DHE
FJALIME PFR KosOVEN (Lutfi Dervishi trans., Tirane 2000). In terms of assessing the success or failure
of the air campaign against the FRY, it is important to understand the previous goals set by the Alli-
ance. These goals have varied during the air campaign. Thus, at the outset, the Clinton administration
circulated three goals for the bombing campaign against the FRY: (1) "to 'demonstrate the seriousness
of NATO's opposition to aggression"'; (2) to deter Milosevic's "'continuing and escalating.., attacks'
in Kosovo"; and (3) to "damage Serbia's capacity to wage war in the future." R.W. Apple, Jr., A Fresh
Set of U.S Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999 at Al; see also Barton Gellman, Allies Facing the Limits
of Air Power, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1999, at Al, A30. The same goals were reflected throughout
NATO's statements on the crisis in Kosovo. The statements required that Milosevic end repression in
Kosovo, withdraw his forces from the province, agree to an international military presence there, agree
to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and provide assurances of his willingness to work
toward a political framework along the lines of the Accords. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana,
Press Conference after the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Foreign Ministers
Level (Apr. 12, 1999), available at http://www.-nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990412a.htm; Press Re-
lease, NATO, Statement on Kosovo Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999 (Apr. 23,
1999), available at http:/www.nato.int/docu/pr/1 999/p99-062e.htm.
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provisions of U.N. Resolution 1244, which acknowledge Serbian sover-
eignty while mandating a final status for Kosovo that assures autonomy.
75
Reference to humanitarian considerations cannot fully explain the
NATO air campaign against the FRY. This argument stems from the events
before and after the air campaign, spanning the period from January-June
1999. While NATO publicly announced its commitment to and endorse-
ment of Resolution 1244, the humanitarian considerations in this U.N.
document did not take precedence over issues such as borders and, most
notably, the preservation of international peace and stability and the resolu-
tion of the final status of Kosovo. In fact, Resolution 1244 is presently the
only legal foundation on which both the civilian and military branches of
the international administration in Kosovo are based.76 Further, when the
Contact Group issued a statement on January 19, 1999, agreeing to sum-
mon representatives from the FRY and Serbian governments and represen-
tatives of the Kosovo Albanians to Rambouillet (southwest of Paris,
France), it attributed the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo to political issues,
suggesting that political solutions related to peace, stability, and the territo-
rial integrity of the FRY and its neighboring states were the only viable
solution to the crisis in Kosovo. 77 This statement was fully endorsed by
NATO on January 30, 1999. 78 In both NATO's statement and the U.N.'s
endorsement of that statement, the previous U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions on the matter were taken fully into account, thus reinforcing the inter-
national community's commitment to the FRY's territorial integrity and to
the preservation of regional peace and stability.
79
The above stance of the international community permeated the entire
negotiating process at Rambouillet. The so-called "nonnegotiable princi-
ples" put forward for signature as a condition for any further discussions on
the Rambouillet Accords stressed the inviolability of the FRY's borders,
implying that any solution had to be found within the FRY's sovereignty
and territorial integrity. 80 In terms of self-determination, this meant, as a
practical matter, that Kosovo and its majority population would have to
75. SeeS.C.Res. 1244, supra note 69.
76. Id
77. See KoSOVO INFO. CTR,, KOSOVO DAILY REP. No. 1677, Big Powers Demand Deal on Kos-
ovo Within Weeks, Jan. 29, 1999, at http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/1999/99-01-29.ksv.html;
Contact Group Sets Deadline Jbr Kosova Agreement, RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Feb. 15, 1999, at
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/l 999/02/4-SEE/see- 150299.asp.
78. See Kosovo INFO. CTR., DAILY REP. No. 1679, NATO Statement on Kosova January 30th,
Jan. 31, 1999, at http://www.hri.org/news/balkanskosova/1999/99-01-31 .ksv.html.
79. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 160 (1998); S.C.
Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
80. See Rambouillet Accords, supra note 69, at pmbl.
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remain satisfied with the internal right to self-determination. This was noth-
ing new for Kosovar Albanians, but they did not want, and still do not
want, to believe that their right to self-determination is limited to internal
self-determination. Earlier, the international community labeled the right to
internal self-determination as "a substantial autonomy for Kosovo. ' '81 How-
ever, apart from vague comparisons with other existing autonomies, no
precise document had been produced showing the full content of a substan-
tial autonomy for Kosovo, at least not before the Rambouillet Accords. The
Rambouillet Accords specified the content of Kosovo's substantial auton-
omy, albeit for an interim period of three years. 82 The document provided
for a democratic self-government and for peace and security for everyone
living in Kosovo. Democratic self-government included all matters of daily
importance to people in Kosovo, such as education, health care, and eco-
nomic development. Kosovo would have a president, an assembly, its own
courts, strong local government, and national community institutions with
the authority needed to protect each community's identity. 83 Security was
meant to be guaranteed by international troops deployed on the ground
throughout Kosovo.84 Local police, representative of all of the national
81. In the past, there have been various models for Kosovar autonomy, some proposed by the
international community and others by the parties themselves. Kosovar autonomy has usually followed
the models of the international community. See Dimimos Triantaphyllou, Kosovo Today: Is There No
Way Out of the Deadlock?, 5 EUR. SECURITY 279, 291-92 (1996); Zoran Lutovac, Options for Solution
of the Problem of Kosovo, 48 REV. INT'L AFFS. 10, 10-12 (1997). The first model consisted in granting
Kosovo a type of autonomy reminiscent of Kosovo's 1974 status. Lutovac, supra, at 10. This was
proposed most frequently by the international community's circles. This version was made public by
the Special Group on Kosovo, acting within the Working Group on Ethnic and National Minorities of
the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, and it remained an option until the conflict in
Kosovo began in February 1998. This model, drafted by the chairperson of the Special Group on Kos-
ovo, German ambassador Gerht Ahrens, envisioned an autonomy for Kosovo based on the 1974 Yugo-
slav Constitution and the experiences of South Tyrol, Spain, Aaland Islands, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Croatia (the so-called "Plan Z4" drafted on behalf of the Serbs living in Croatia). See Hugh Poulton,
The Rest of the Balkans, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 66, 71-72 (Hugh Miall ed., 1994). The
second model dealt with the refederalization of the FRY. It meant a supplemental or new federalization
of the FRY, making Kosovo, in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, a separate federal unit, that is, a
third republic. This was exactly what the Kosovar Albanians demanded in the 1981 riots. Since the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, however, this solution has been considered obsolete. On the Serbian side,
this proposal was supported by the so-called Serbian Resistance Movement leader, Momcilo Trajkovic.
See Kosovo INFO. CTR., DAILY REP. No. 1736, Carl Bildt, Kosovo Should Have the Same Status as
Montenegro, June 3, 1997 (Albanian version only). Trajkovic has on several occasions asked for Kos-
ovo to be a third republic within the FRY. In one case, Trajkovic has even threatened that if Kosovars
do not accept this, Serbs should pursue refederalization by a military campaign against Kosovo. See
Kosovo INFO. CTR., DAILY REP. No. 1945, Jan. 20, 1997 (Albanian version only).
82. The Rambouillet Peace Accords also contained the so-called nonnegotiable principles, in
which the issue of the FRY's territorial integrity and sovereignty took precedence. See Rambouillet
Accords, supra note 69, at pmbl.
83. Id. at ch. 1, arts. II-VII.
84. Id. at ch. 7, arts. I-XVI.
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communities in Kosovo, were to provide for routine law enforcement. 85
Federal and Republic security forces would have to leave Kosovo, except
for a limited border protection presence. 86 The final issue concerned a final
settlement for Kosovo: an international meeting was to be convened after
three years to develop a mechanism for a final settlement. The will of the
people was established as an important factor to be taken into account at
that international meeting.
87
Despite the guarantees given regarding the FRY's territorial integrity
and sovereignty, Belgrade authorities refused to sign the document. Mil-
osevic's regime, instead of negotiating the peace terms of Rambouillet,
continued its war campaign throughout Kosovo, expelling thousands of
Albanians from their homes. 88 By the time the Rambouillet Conference
ended, the humanitarian situation in Kosovo was becoming a real threat to
regional peace and stability as hundreds of thousands of refugees flowed
into Albania and Macedonia. NATO had no choice but to act according to
its statement of January 30, 1999.89 However, by the time the air strikes
began on March 24, 1999, the language of NATO leaders changed. Empha-
sis was now put entirely on humanitarian concerns rather than on other
considerations connected to regional peace and stability.90 This was not,
however, the language of Resolution 1244. Resolution 1244's ranking of
issues in order of importance differs from the Rambouillet Accords. In the
Resolution, as in previous resolutions concerning the crisis in Kosovo, the
preservation of regional peace and security and the FRY's territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty took prominence. Only then did humanitarian issues
85. Id at ch. 2, art. 11.
86. Id. at ch. 7, arts. III-V.
87. Id. at ch. 8, art. I, para. 3. The Rambouillet Accords provide:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be
convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will
of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementa-
tion of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assess-
ment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for
additional measures.
Id.
88. Justin Brown, Uncomfortable Peace in Kosovo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 14, 1998, at 1.
89. Norman Kempster, Warring Sides in Kosovo Get Ultimatum, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at
Al.
90. In fact, apart from the FRY's territorial integrity, regional stability and security, and the
humanitarian situation in Kosovo, there had been only one case where NATO expressly referred to a
political aim if it intervened in Kosovo. Namely, the then NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, said
on January 22, 1999, that NATO's political aim was to restore the autonomous status that Kosovo
enjoyed according to the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia. This meant that military intervention would
have as a result, if not a direct aim, the imposition of a status of autonomy (or internal self-
determination) on Kosovo, which it enjoyed previously during Tito's time. See Kosovo INFO. CTR.,
DAILY REP. No. 2308 B, Jan. 22, 1999 (Albanian version only).
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(the return of refugees and the displaced persons), the final settlement of
the status of Kosovo, and the implementation of a temporary regime of
self-government play a role.9 1 In practical terms this meant that NATO's
air strikes, viewed from the perspective of Kosovar self-determination,
have resulted in the preservation of the regional peace and stability, the
conclusion of the FRY's territorial integrity and sovereignty, the protection
of the Kosovar Albanian population, and, finally, the initial preparation for
a political solution of the Kosovo issue via granting "substantial autonomy"
for the region.92 In fact, governance in a form of "substantial autonomy"
has been offered to the Kosovar Albanians on and off since 1989. It would
be a mistake to focus on the humanitarian justification at the expense of the
broader political agenda.
Resolution 1244 recalls and fully endorses the previous U.N. Security
Council resolutions on the crisis in Kosovo.93 Earlier resolutions, as well as
Resolution 1244, called for the preservation of the FRY's territorial integ-
rity and the integrity of its neighboring states.94 Resolution 1244 further
codified the G-8 formula for the political solution of the Kosovo conflict,
91- Two international mediators, one on behalf of the EU, Martti Ahtisari, and the other on behalf
of the Russian Federation, Victor Chemomyrdin, have later revealed that Milosevic had accepted
NATO's conditions for surrender when he was given by them assurances that the international mission
in Kosovo would be under the U.N. auspices and, above all, that the same community guaranteed the
FRY's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo. See Letter dated 28 July 1999 from the Charg6
D'Affaires A.l. of Yugoslavia [Vladislav Jovanovic] to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council Annex, 2-4, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess,, Doe. S/1999/828 (1999). For the com-
ments of both international mediators, see Victor Chernomyrdin, Nismo Izdali Srbiju [Interview], NIN
(Belgrade), Oct. 14, 1999, at 49; Martti Ahtisari, Nuk e Kam Kerenuar Mitoseviein, KOSOVA SOT, July
26, 2000, at 8 (Pristina-based Kosova daily).
92. Apart from NATO's pronouncements on political issues, such as that regarding the status of
the 1974 autonomy enjoyed by Kosovo during Tito's time, some Western officials have, at an earlier
stage of the conflict in Kosovo, made statements regarding the Western commitments to the FRY's
territorial integrity. Thus, in his visit to Prishtina in early March 1998, the U.S. Special Envoy for
Kosovo, Robert Gelbard, unwittingly underscored the validity of the peace option by revealing Ameri-
cans' and others' support (mainly in NATO countries) for "Yugoslav integrity." This, in turn, gave
Milosevic a free hand to expel almost the entire population of Kosovo, killing innocent civilians and
applying a scorched earth policy. For criticism of this Western stance, see James Brady, History Proves
Again Balkan's Bite is Worse Than its Bark, ADVERTISING AGE, July 13 1998, at 25; Justin Brown,
Living in Cross Hairs of NATO, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct. 7, 1998, at 1; Brown, supra note 88, at
1; Janusz Bugajski, Act Now in Kosovo, or Regret it Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 11, 1998, at
19; Mark Dennis, Kosovo: Locked and Loaded, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1998, at 50; Michael Hirsh, The
Balkans: Holbrooke's Nervy Game of Chicken, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1998, at 50, 51; Jonathan S.
Landay, NATO's Drums Beat Louder Over Kosovo, CHRISTIAN SCt MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1998, at 1, 7;
Richard J_ Newman, NA TO' Patience is Wearing Thin, U-S- NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 19, 1998, at
40; Miles A. Pomper, NATO Readies Strike Plans Against Serbia, 56 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 2031 (1998);
Ronald Steel, Hijacked, NEW REPUBLIC, July 13, 1998, at 10.
93. S.C. Res. 1244, see supra note 69, at pmbl.
94. Id.
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adopted on May 6, 1999.95 The formula is more or less the one expressed
in Resolution 1244 which "reaffirm[s] the call in previous resolutions for
substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo.
' 96
Among the responsibilities of the international civil presence in Kosovo is
to "facilitate[e] a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future
status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords." 97 The end result of
this is that, at least in a formal sense, the policy of Greater Serbia has not
been defeated in Kosovo, at least not as long as the international commu-
nity treats the policy as an integral part of the Serb-dominated FRY. In this
formal sense, again, there is a striking similarity between the position of
Kosovo and the "Republika Srpska" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 98 Both are
entitled to "autonomy" but not to independence.
IV. THE UNION AGREEMENT EMBRACES THE SELF-DETERMINATION
MODEL OF RESOLUTION 1244 AND RAMBOUILLET
Despite the fact that Resolution 1244 strives to preserve territorial in-
tegrity and international stability by all means possible, it still refers re-
peatedly to the provisional nature of the international mission in Kosovo.
This provisional character of UNMIK suggests a need for further settle-
ment of the final status of the country. At first glance, it would appear to
one unfamiliar with the legal and political background as if the final status
95. See Letter Dated 6 May 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Germany [Dieter Kas-
trup] to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. SCOR,
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/516 (1999).
96. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 69, at pmbl.
97. Id. 11l(e).
98. Some argue that Resolution 1244 and UNMIK were meant to empower Kosovo, but that they
have created a sovereignty problem instead. This is not true at all. Kosovo is not under international
governance, but under an international administration. According to international practice and theory,
there is a huge difference between these two forms of political organization, and both forms have their
own characteristics. In the case of Kosovo, UNMIK and Resolution 1244 are unambiguous in pur-
pose-to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USM, which includes Kosovo. How-
ever, it was and is unclear how this should be achieved. Initially, UNMIK pursued a custodian-style
mission, and only recently has it realized that this kind of international administration does not work. It
should either turn itself into a kind of "helping hand system," such as that in Bosnia-Herzegovina at
present, or into an "advise and help system," like what we saw in East Timor. Locals should be allowed
to assume more responsibility for their own government, and the will of the people should be at least
observed, if not respected entirely, in decisions about daily life and the future of the country. For more
on these issues, see the following: Patrick T. Egan, The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-
Defence, 8 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 39 (2001); Espen Barth Eide, The Internal Security Challenge in
Kosovo, INT'L SPECTATOR, Jan.-Mar. 2000, at 49; Enrico Milano, Security Council Action in the Bal-
kans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo's Territorial Status, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 999 (2003); Daniel N.
Nelson, Kosovo Futures, Western Dilemmas, INT'L SPECTATOR, Apr.-June 2002, at 11 12; Ralph
Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond. The Role of International Territorial Administration,
95 AM- J. INT'L L_ 583 (2001); Susan L. Woodward, Kosovo and the Region: Consequences of the
Waiting Game, INT'L SPECTATOR, Jan.-Mar. 2000, at 35.
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of Kosovo, and of the "Republika Srpska" for that matter, is not yet settled.
This might be well true if looked at from an Albanian perspective. Kosovar
Albanians continue to believe that Resolution 1244 and the Agreement,
discussed further below, do not foreclose the issue of independence. In-
deed, Kosovar Albanians equate the issue of the final status of Kosovo with
full independence. As we saw from our earlier discussions, this is not the
most likely scenario.
More likely, Resolution 1244 and the Union Agreement foreclose only
one form of self-determination, that is, the full independence and sover-
eignty of Kosovo. One might respond that in a strict legal sense, the Union
Agreement is not legally binding because it does not fit the terms of the
U.N. Charter, which require the registration of the document in order for it
to be a valid international treaty. Almost all documents regarding former
Yugoslavia, however-including the Dayton Agreement-have been of
dubious validity if viewed through the classical lens of international law.
What matters is that the West, as the author of the all basic papers on for-
mer Yugoslavia, has played "a major role in shaping the region's past, pre-
sent, and-as it now seems-future." 99
The Rambouillet Accords were reinforced by the Union Agreement.
The Union Agreement has very few articles, but the meaning and the mes-
sage it conveys are quite far-reaching and comprehensive. The Union
Agreement represents in a sense a kind of a road map for the stabilization
of the overall situation in the USM. In that regard, its provisions can be
divided into two categories. The first category deals with the relationship
between Serbia and Montenegro. °0 0 The second category of provisions,
which is by far shorter, deals with the relationship between Serbia and
Kosovo, on the one hand, and the relationship between both of them and
the international community on the other. 101 Only the latter provisions are
of interest here because the provisions concerning the relationship between
Serbia and Montenegro are of a constitutional nature and are chiefly in-
tended for internal use. Thus far, both categories have, in fact, been imple-
mented entirely, including the election of all bodies under the new Union
between Serbia and Montenegro.
The second part of the Union Agreement states that:
Upon the expiration of a three-year period, the member states shall be
entitled to instituting proceedings for a change of the state status, that is,
withdrawal from the state union. If Montenegro withdraws from the state
99. Charles Ingrao, Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: An Historical Perspective,
27 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 291, 291 (1999).
100. Union Agreementsupra note 1, 1,2.
101. ld.13.
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union, international documents related to the FRY, the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on
Serbia as its successor.
102
The insertion of this provision in the Union Agreement, absent in the final
draft of the Rambouillet Accords due to fervent opposition by the Kosovar
Albanians, means that if and when Montenegro secedes from the Union,
Serbia will once again have full sovereign rights over Kosovo. In addition,
it means that the international community would endorse such an assertion
of Serb sovereignty because it is in line with the general understanding of
the internal forms of self-determination.
The main problems with the Union Agreement as a model for Kosovo
are, first, that the agreement is more symbolism than substance, and, sec-
ond, that it is the result of an ad hoc, pragmatic political response to the
threat of Montenegrin secession that does not reflect any carefully thought-
out structures that would be likely to promote the viability of the Union.
The Union Agreement lacks credible enforcement mechanisms. Compared
with the Dayton Peace Accords, this agreement lacks instruments that
would encourage and help build social and political cohesion within the
new USM. This means that the Union Agreement is based on temporiz-
ing-putting off a crisis for another day-much as UNMIK has treated the
question of final status for Kosovo.
CONCLUSION
The philosophy of the Union Agreement is what makes us fearful of
proposals for territorial rearrangements of Kosovo's interior, whether in the
form of cantons, decentralization, or otherwise. The only way to produce
peace and stability in the region as a whole is to invest in an overall social
and cultural restructuring of Kosovar society through efforts that change
the minds and behavior of ordinary Kosovars. Self-determination forms,
applicable since 1991, can and should be a reference point to start work on
a new enlightenment project beneficial to all.
102. Id.
2005]

